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Abstract
We show that the classical interpretations of Tarski’s inductive defi-
nitions actually allow us to define the satisfaction and truth of the quan-
tified formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain
N of the natural numbers in two essentially different ways: (a) in terms
of algorithmic verifiabilty; and (b) in terms of algorithmic computabil-
ity. We show that the classical Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard)
of PA essentially defines the satisfaction and truth of the formulas of
the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA in terms of algorithmic verifiabil-
ity. It is accepted that this classical interpretation—in terms of algo-
rithmic verifiabilty—cannot lay claim to be finitary ; it does not lead
to a finitary justification of the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction of
PA from which we may conclude—in an intuitionistically unobjection-
able manner—that PA is consistent. We now show that the PA-axioms—
including the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction—are, however, algorith-
mically computable finitarily as satisfied / true under the Standard inter-
pretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA; and that the PA rules of inference do
preserve algorithmically computable satisfiability / truth finitarily under
the Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard). We conclude that the algo-
rithmically computable PA-formulas can provide a finitary interpretation
IPA(N, Algorithmic) of PA from which we may classically conclude that PA
is consistent in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner. We define
this interpretation, and show that if the associated logic is interpreted
finitarily then (i) PA is categorical and (ii) Go¨del’s Theorem VI holds
vacuously in PA since PA is consistent but not ω-consistent. This reflects
the fact that PA is ω-consistent if, and only if, Aristotle’s particularisa-
tion is presumed to always hold under any interpretation of the associated
logic; and that the standard interpretation of PA is a model of PA if, and
only if, PA is ω-consistent.
Keywords Algorithmic computability, algorithmic verifiability, Aristotle’s particu-
larisation, consistency, first-order, ω-consistency, Peano Arithmetic PA, satisfaction,
soundness, standard interpretation, Tarski.
∗Subject class: LO; MSC: 03B10
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper1, ‘Evidence-Based Interpretations of PA’, presented at the
Symposium on Computational Philosophy at the AISB/IACAP 2012 World
Congress, Birmingham, we showed first that—in addition to the classically de-
fined Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of the first order Peano Arith-
metic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers—Tarski’s classical defini-
tions of the satisfaction and truth of the formulas of a formal language under
an interpretation admit two evidence-based interpretations of PA under the
standard first order logic FOL:
• An Instantiational interpretation IPA(N, Instantiational) of PA over the do-
main N of the PA numerals; and
• An Algorithmic interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) of PA over the domain
N of the natural numbers.
We then showed that the Instantiational interpretation IPA(N, Instantiational) of
PA is sound if, and only if, the Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA
is sound; where we defined an interpretation of PA as sound if, and only if:
• The axioms of PA are true under the interpretation; and
• The PA rules of inference preserve such truth.
We further showed that:
• The axioms of PA are true under the Algorithmic interpretation IPA(N, Algo−
rithmic) of PA; and
• The PA rules of inference preserve such truth.
We concluded that:
• The Algorithmic interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) of PA is sound; and
• PA is consistent.
1.1 The philosophical question addressed by our investi-
gation
Our investigation sought to address the question:
• Is there any objective evidence to justify the acceptance of arithmetical
propositions as ‘true’ on the grounds that such ‘truth’ is self-evident?
We noted, for instance, that conventional wisdom follows Tarski’s inductive
definitions of the ‘satisfiability’ and ‘truth’ of the formulas of a formal language
such as PA under an interpretation when it implicitly and, as we shall show2,
non-finitarily3 holds that:
1[An12].
2In Theorem 7.
3We use the term ‘finitary’ essentially in the broader sense detailed by David Hilbert in
[Hi25]. See also the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on ‘Hilbert’s Program: The
Finitary Point of View’ at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hilbert-program/#2.
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• The Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA over the domain N
of the natural numbers is sound if the standard interpretation of FOL is
sound.
In other words, conventional wisdom holds it as self-evident that—even though
an infinite process is implicit in their decidability:
• The denumerable atomic formulas of PA can be assumed as decidable
under the Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA;
• The denumerable PA axioms can be assumed to interpret as true under
the Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA;
• The PA rules of inference can be assumed to preserve truth under the
Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA.
What this means is that conventional wisdom also holds it as self-evident under
the standard interpretation of FOL that—even though an infinite process is
implicit in the decidability:
• The formula [(∀x)F (x)] is decidable under the Standard interpretation
IPA(N, Standard) of PA.
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• If the formula [(∃x)F (x)] is true under the Standard interpretation IPA(N,
Standard) of PA, then there must exist some numeral [n] for which the
formula [F (n)] is true under the interpretation.5
We also noted that—unless we assume that PA is ω-consistent—we cannot con-
clude by FOL that:
• If the formula [(∃x)F (x)] is provable in PA, then there must exist some
numeral [n] for which the formula [F (n)] is provable in PA.
1.2 What differentiates our approach?
Our approach to the above investigation can be differentiated by noting first
that, in comparison, conventional wisdom—essentially following David Hilbert6—
can be labelled ‘theistic’ in that it implicitly assumes both that:
• The standard first order logic FOL is consistent;
and that:
4We note that, as emphasised by Edward Nelson in [Ne00], the assumption of the un-
qualified decidability of quantified formulas under Tarski’s definitions has been a matter of
controversy. Theorem 7 now shows that the assumption is indeed untenable.
5In other words Aristotle’s particularisation (Definition 1) is valid—without qualification—
over N .
6In a 1925 address ([Hi25]) Hilbert had shown that the axiomatisation Lε of classical Aris-
totlean predicate logic proposed by him as a formal first-order ε-predicate calculus (detailed
in [Hi27], pp.465-466) in which he used a primitive choice-function ([Hi25], p.382) symbol,
‘ε’, for defining the quantifiers ‘∀’ and ‘∃’ would adequately express—and yield, under a suit-
able interpretation—Aristotle’s logic of predicates if the ε-function was interpreted to yield
Aristotlean particularisation ([Hi25], pp.382-383; [Hi27], p.466(1)).
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• The standard interpretation of FOL is sound.
The significance of the label ‘theistic’ is that conventional wisdom
tacitly believes that Aristotle’s particularisation7 remains valid—
without qualification—even over infinite domains; a belief that is
not unequivocally self-evident, but must be appealed to as an article
of faith.
We note second that, in sharp contrast, constructive approaches to mathematics—
such as Intuitionism—can be labelled ‘atheistic’ since they deny both that:
• FOL is consistent (since they deny the Law of The Excluded Middle8.);
and that:
• The standard interpretation of FOL is sound (since they deny Aristotle’s
particularisation).
The significance of the label ‘atheistic’ is that whereas constructive
approaches to mathematics deny the faith-based belief in the validity
of Aristotle’s particularisation—without qualification—over infinite
domains, their denial of the Law of the Excluded Middle is itself a
belief—in the inconsistency of FOL—that is also not unequivocally
self-evident, and must also be appealed to as an article of faith9.
In our investigation, however, we follow what may be labelled an ‘agnostic’
approach by noting that although, if Aristotle’s particularisation holds in an
interpretation then the Law of the Excluded Middle must also hold in the in-
terpretation, the converse is not true.
We thus follow a middle path by explicitly assuming that:
• FOL is consistent;
and explicitly state when an argument appeals to the postulation that:
• The standard interpretation of FOL is sound.
The significance of the label ‘agnostic’ is that we neither hold FOL
to be inconsistent, nor hold that Aristotle’s particularisation can be
applied—without qualification—over infinite domains.
7Definition 1.
8“The formula ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) is classically provable, and hence under classical inter-
pretation true. But it is unrealizable. So if realizability is accepted as a necessary condition
for intuitionistic truth, it is untrue intuitionistically, and therefore unprovable not only in the
present intuitionistic formal system, but by any intuitionistic methods whatsoever”. [Kl52],
p.513.
9Although Brouwer’s explicitly stated objection appeared to be to the Law of the Excluded
Middle as expressed and interpreted at the time ([Br23], p.335-336; [Kl52], p.47; [Hi27],
p.475), some of Kleene’s remarks ([Kl52], p.49), some of Hilbert’s remarks (for instance in
[Hi27], p.474) and, more particularly, Kolmogorov’s remarks (in [Ko25], fn. p.419; p.432)
suggest that the intent of Brouwer’s fundamental objection can also be viewed today as being
limited only to the yet prevailing belief—as an article of faith—that the validity of Aristotle’s
particularisation can be extended without qualification to infinite domains.
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2 Overview
In this paper we revisit the arguments of [An12] and consider some consequences.
Specifically, we first define what it means for a formula of an arithmetical lan-
guage such as the first order Peano Arithmetic PA to be:
(i) Algorithmically verifiable (Definition 12);
(ii) Algorithmically computable (Definition 13).
under an interpretation.
We then show that:
(a) The PA-formulas are decidable under the standard interpretation
of PA if, and only if, they are algorithmically verifiable under the
interpretation (Corollary 2);
Although the standard interpretation is believed to define a model
of PA, the definition cannot claim to be finitary since it does not
lead to a finitary justification of the Axiom Schema of (finite) In-
duction of PA from which we may conclude—in an intuitionistically
unobjectionable manner—that PA is consistent10 . We note further
that Gerhard Gentzen’s ‘constructive’11 consistency proof for for-
mal number theory12 is debatably finitary13, since it involves a Rule
of Infinite Induction that admits appeal to the well-ordering prop-
erty of transfinite ordinals; and we show in Section 13, Appendix E
that we cannot introduce a transfinite ordinal into any model of PA
without inviting inconsistency.
(b) The PA-axioms are algorithmically computable as satisfied / true
under the standard interpretation of PA (Lemmas 4 and 5);
(c) Generalisation and Modus Ponens preserve algorithmically com-
putable truth under the standard interpretation of PA (Lemmas 6
and 7);
(d) The provable PA-formulas are precisely the ones that are algo-
rithmically computable as satisfied / true under the standard inter-
pretation of PA (Theorem 4).
We conclude that the algorithmically computable PA-formulas can provide a
sound—in the sense of Definition 10—finitary interpretation of PA (Theorem
5).
We note that PA is ω-consistent if, and only if, Aristotle’s particularisation (Def-
inition 1) is presumed to always hold under any interpretation of the associated
logic (Section 9, Appendix A).
We then show that if classical first-order logic is interpreted finitarily (Section
11, Appendix C) without the presumption that Aristotle’s particularisation nec-
essarily holds under the interpretation, then we may conclude that:
10The possibility/impossibility of such justification was the subject of the famous Poincare´-
Hilbert debate. See [Hi27], p.472; also [Br13], p.59; [We27], p.482; [Pa71], p.502-503.
11In the sense highlighted by Elliott Mendelson in [Me64], p.261.
12cf. [Me64], p258.
13See for instance http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert’s program.
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(f) PA is consistent (Theorem 6);
(g) PA is categorical (Corollary 4);
(h) PA is not ω-consistent (Corollary 6);
(i) the standard interpretation of PA is not sound14, and does not
yield a model for PA (Corollary 7).
2.1 Notation, Definitions and Comments
Comments We have taken some liberty in emphasising standard definitions
selectively, and interspersing our arguments liberally with comments and ref-
erences, generally of a foundational nature. These are intended to reflect our
underlying thesis that essentially arithmetical problems appear more natural
when expressed—and viewed—within the perspective of an interpretation of
PA that appeals to the evidence provided by a deterministic algorithm along
the lines suggested in Section 5; a perspective that, by its very nature, cannot
appeal implicitly to transfinite concepts.
Evidence “It is by now folklore . . . that one can view the values of a simple
functional language as specifying evidence for propositions in a constructive
logic . . . ”15.
Notation We use square brackets to indicate that the contents represent a
symbol or a formula—of a formal theory—generally assumed to be well-formed
unless otherwise indicated by the context.16 We use an asterisk to indicate that
the associated expression is to be interpreted semantically with respect to some
well-defined interpretation.
Definition 1 Aristotle’s particularisation This holds that from a meta-
assertion such as:
‘It is not the case that: For any given x, P ∗(x) does not hold’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘¬(∀x)¬P ∗(x)’, we may always validly infer in
the classical, Aristotlean, logic of predicates17 that:
‘There exists an unspecified x such that P ∗(x) holds’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)’.
The significance of Aristotle’s particularisation for the first-order pred-
icate calculus: We note that in a formal language the formula ‘[(∃x)P (x)]’ is an
abbreviation for the formula ‘[¬(∀x)¬P (x)]’. The commonly accepted interpre-
tation of this formula—and a fundamental tenet of classical logic unrestrictedly
14In the sense of Definition 10.
15[Mu91].
16In other words, expressions inside the square brackets are to be only viewed syntactically
as juxtaposition of symbols that are to be formed and manipulated upon strictly in accordance
with specific rules for such formation and manipulation—in the manner of a mechanical or
electronic device—without any regards to what the symbolism might represent semantically
under an interpretation that gives them meaning.
17[HA28], pp.58-59.
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adopted as intuitively obvious by standard literature18 that seeks to build upon
the formal first-order predicate calculus—tacitly appeals to Aristotlean particu-
larisation.
However, L. E. J. Brouwer had noted in his seminal 1908 paper on the unreli-
ability of logical principles19 that the commonly accepted interpretation of this
formula is ambiguous if interpretation is intended over an infinite domain.
Brouwer essentially argued that, even supposing the formula ‘[P (x)]’ of a for-
mal Arithmetical language interprets as an arithmetical relation denoted by
‘P ∗(x)’, and the formula ‘[¬(∀x)¬P (x)]’ as the arithmetical proposition denoted
by ‘¬(∀x)¬P ∗(x)’, the formula ‘[(∃x)P (x)]’ need not interpret as the arithmeti-
cal proposition denoted by the usual abbreviation ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)’; and that such
postulation is invalid as a general logical principle in the absence of a means for
constructing some putative object a for which the proposition P ∗(a) holds in
the domain of the interpretation.
Hence we shall follow the convention that the assumption that ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)’
is the intended interpretation of the formula ‘[(∃x)P (x)]’—which is essentially
the assumption that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over the domain of the
interpretation—must always be explicit.
The significance of Aristotle’s particularisation for PA: In order to avoid
intuitionistic objections to his reasoning, Kurt Go¨del introduced the syntactic
property of ω-consistency20 as an explicit assumption in his formal reasoning in
his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions21.
Go¨del explained at some length22 that his reasons for introducing ω-consistency
explicitly was to avoid appealing to the semantic concept of classical arithmetical
truth in Aristotle’s logic of predicates (which presumes Aristotle’s particularisa-
tion).
We show in Section 9, Appendix A that the two concepts are meta-mathematically
equivalent in the sense that, if PA is consistent, then PA is ω-consistent if, and
only if, Aristotle’s particularisation holds under the standard interpretation of
PA.
Definition 2 The structure of the natural numbers: {N (the set of natu-
ral numbers); = (equality); ′ (the successor function); + (the addition function);
∗ (the product function); 0 (the null element)}.
Definition 3 The axioms of first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA)
PA1 [(x1 = x2)→ ((x1 = x3)→ (x2 = x3))];
PA2 [(x1 = x2)→ (x
′
1 = x
′
2)];
PA3 [0 6= x
′
1];
PA4 [(x
′
1 = x
′
2)→ (x1 = x2)];
PA5 [(x1 + 0) = x1];
PA6 [(x1 + x
′
2) = (x1 + x2)
′];
PA7 [(x1 ⋆ 0) = 0];
PA8 [(x1 ⋆ x
′
2) = ((x1 ⋆ x2) + x1)];
PA9 For any well-formed formula [F (x)] of PA:
[F (0)→ (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′)))→ (∀x)F (x))].
18See [Hi25], p.382; [HA28], p.48; [Sk28], p.515; [Go31], p.32.; [Kl52], p.169; [Ro53], p.90;
[BF58], p.46; [Be59], pp.178 & 218; [Su60], p.3; [Wa63], p.314-315; [Qu63], pp.12-13; [Kn63],
p.60; [Co66], p.4; [Me64], p.52(ii); [Nv64], p.92; [Li64], p.33; [Sh67], p.13; [Da82], p.xxv;
[Rg87], p.xvii; [EC89], p.174; [Mu91]; [Sm92], p.18, Ex.3; [BBJ03], p.102.
19[Br08].
20The significance of ω-consistency for the formal system PA is highlighted in Section 9,
Appendix A.
21[Go31], p.23 and p.28.
22In his introduction on p.9 of [Go31].
7
Definition 4 Generalisation in PA If [A] is PA-provable, then so is [(∀x)A].
Definition 5 Modus Ponens in PA If [A] and [A → B] are PA-provable,
then so is [B].
Definition 6 Standard interpretation of PA The standard interpretation
IPA(N, Standard) of PA over the structure N is the one in which the logical
constants have their ‘usual’ interpretations23 in Aristotle’s logic of predicates
(which subsumes Aristotle’s particularisation), and24:
(a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain;
(b) the symbol [0] interprets as the integer 0;
(c) the symbol [′] interprets as the successor operation (addition of 1);
(d) the symbols [+] and [∗] interpret as ordinary addition and multiplication;
(e) the symbol [=] interprets as the identity relation.
Definition 7 Simple consistency: A formal system S is simply consistent
if, and only if, there is no S-formula [F (x)] for which both [(∀x)F (x)] and
[¬(∀x)F (x)] are S-provable.
Definition 8 ω-consistency: A formal system S is ω-consistent if, and only
if, there is no S-formula [F (x)] for which, first, [¬(∀x)F (x)] is S-provable and,
second, [F (a)] is S-provable for any given S-term [a].
Definition 9 Soundness (formal system - non-standard): A formal sys-
tem S is sound under an interpretation IS with respect to a domain D if, and
only if, every theorem [T ] of S translates as ‘[T ] is true under IS in D’.
Definition 10 Soundness (interpretation - non-standard): An interpre-
tation IS of a formal system S is sound with respect to a domain D if, and only
if, S is sound under the interpretation IS over the domain D.
Soundness in classical logic: In classical logic, a formal system S is sometimes
defined as ‘sound’ if, and only if, it has an interpretation; and an interpretation
is defined as the assignment of meanings to the symbols, and truth-values to the
sentences, of the formal system. Moreover, any such interpretation is defined as
a model25 of the formal system. This definition suffers, however, from an implicit
circularity: the formal logic L underlying any interpretation of S is implicitly assumed
to be ‘sound’. The above definitions seek to avoid this implicit circularity by delinking
the defined ‘soundness’ of a formal system under an interpretation from the implicit
‘soundness’ of the formal logic underlying the interpretation. This admits the case
where, even if L1 and L2 are implicitly assumed to be sound, S + L1 is sound, but
S + L2 is not. Moreover, an interpretation of S is now a model for S if, and only if,
it is sound.26
Definition 11 Categoricity: A formal system S is categorical if, and only
if, it has a sound27 interpretation and any two sound interpretations of S are
isomorphic.28
23These are expressed formally in Section 10, Appendix B, and essentially follow the defi-
nitions in [Me64], p.49.
24See [Me64], p.107.
25We follow the definition in [Me64], p.51.
26My thanks to Professor Rohit Parikh for highlighting the need for making such a distinc-
tion explicit.
27In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
28Compare [Me64], p.91.
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3 Interpretation of an arithmetical language in
terms of the computations of a simple func-
tional language
We begin by noting that we can, in principle, define29 the classical ‘satisfaction’
and ‘truth’ of the formulas of a first order arithmetical language, such as PA,
verifiably under an interpretation using as evidence30 the computations of a
simple functional language.
Such definitions follow straightforwardly for the atomic formulas of the language
(i.e., those without the logical constants that correspond to ‘negation’, ‘conjunc-
tion’, ‘implication’ and ‘quantification’) from the standard definition of a simple
functional language31.
Moreover, following Alfred Tarski’s seminal 1933 paper on the the concept of
truth in the languages of the deductive sciences32, the classical ‘satisfaction’ and
‘truth’ of those formulas of a first-order language which contain logical constants
can be inductively defined, under an interpretation, in terms of the ‘satisfaction’
and ‘truth’ of the interpretations of only the atomic formulas of the language.
Hence, classically, the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘truth’ of those formulas of an arithmeti-
cal language such as PA which contain logical constants can, in principle, also
be defined verifiably under an interpretation using as evidence the computations
of a simple functional language.
We show in Section 5 that this is indeed the case for PA under the standard
interpretation IPA(N, Standard), when this is explicitly defined as in Section 6.
We show, moreover, that we can further define ‘algorithmic truth’ and ‘algo-
rithmic falsehood’ finitarily under IPA(N, Standard) such that the PA axioms
interpret as always algorithmically true, and the rules of inference preserve al-
gorithmic truth, over the domain N of the natural numbers.
Significance of ‘algorithmic truth’: The algorithmically true propositions
of N under IPA(N, Standard) are, moreover, a proper subset
33 of the verifiably
true propositions of N under IPA(N, Standard); they suggest a possible finitary
model of PA that establishes the consistency of PA constructively.
3.1 The definitions of ‘algorithmic truth’ and ‘algorithmic
falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard) are not symmetric with
respect to ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard)
However, the definitions of ‘algorithmic truth’ and ‘algorithmic falsehood’ under
IPA(N, Standard) are not symmetric with respect to classical (verifiable) ‘truth’
and ‘falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard).
For instance, if a formula [(∀x)F (x)] of an arithmetic is algorithmically true
under an interpretation (such as IPA(N, Standard)), then we may conclude that
29Formal definitions are given in Section 5.
30[Mu91].
31Such as, for instance, that of a deterministic Turing machine ([Me64], pp.229-231) based
essentially on Alan Turing’s seminal 1936 paper on computable numbers ([Tu36]).
32[Ta33].
33This follows immediately from Corollary 5.
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there is a deterministic algorithm that, for any given numeral [a], provides
evidence that the formula [F (a)] is algorithmically true under the interpretation.
In other words, there is a deterministic algorithm that provides evidence that
the interpretation F ∗(a) of [F (a)] holds in N for any given natural number a.
Defining the term ‘hold’: We define the term ‘hold’—when used in connec-
tion with an interpretation of a formal language and, more specifically, with
reference to the computations of a simple functional language associated with
the atomic formulas of the language—explicitly in Section 5; the aim being to
avoid appealing to the classically subjective (and existential) connotation implic-
itly associated with the term under an implicitly defined standard interpretation
of an arithmetic34.
However, if a formula [(∀x)F (x)] of an arithmetic is algorithmically false under
an interpretation, then we can only conclude that there is no deterministic
algorithm that, for any given natural number a, can provide evidence whether
the interpretation F ∗(a) holds or not in N .
We cannot therefore conclude that there is a numeral [a] such that the formula
[F (a)] is algorithmically false under the interpretation; nor can we conclude that
there is a natural number b such that F ∗(b) does not hold in N .
Such a conclusion would require:
(i) either some additional evidence that will verify for some assign-
ment of numerical values to the free variables of [F ] that the corre-
sponding interpretation F ∗ does not hold35;
(ii) or the additional assumption that either Aristotle’s particulari-
sation36 holds over the domain of the interpretation (as is implicitly
presumed under the standard interpretation of PA) or that the arith-
metic is ω-consistent37.
4 Defining algorithmic verifiability and algorith-
mic computability
The asymmetry of Section 3.1 suggests38 the following two concepts39:
Definition 12 Algorithmic verifiability: single variable
An arithmetical relational formula [F (x)] is algorithmically verifiable under an
interpretation if, and only if, for any given numeral [n], we can define a de-
terministic algorithm ALn which provides objective evidence for deciding the
34As, for instance, in [Go31].
35Essentially reflecting Brouwer’s objection to the assumption of Aristotle’s particularisation
over an infinite domain.
36Definition 1.
37An assumption explicitly introduced by Go¨del in [Go31].
38My thanks to Dr. Chaitanya H. Mehta for advising that the focus of this investigation
should be the distinction between these two concepts.
39When dealing with infinite processes, the distinction sought to be made between algorith-
mically verifiable formulas and algorithmically computable formulas can be viewed as reflecting
in number theory the analogous distinction that is made in analysis between, for instance,
continuous functions ([Ru53], p.65, §4.5) and uniformly continuous functions ([Ru53], p.65,
§4.13); or that between convergent sequences ([Ru53], p.65, §7.1) and uniformly convergent
sequences ([Ru53], p.65, §7.7).
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truth/falsity of each proposition in the finite sequence {[F (1)], [F (2)], . . . , [F (n)]}
under the interpretation.
Example: Since any real number is definable as the limit of a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers:
• Let [R(n)] denote the nth digit in the decimal expression of the real number R in binary
notation.
• Then, for any given natural number n, there is a deterministic algorithm ALn that will decide
the truth/falsity of each proposition in the sequence {[R(1) = 0], [R(2) = 0], . . . , [R(n) = 0]}.
• Hence [R(x) = 0] is algorithmically verifiable.
Definition 13 Algorithmic computability: single variable
An arithmetical relational formula [F (x)] is algorithmically computable under
an interpretation if, and only if, we can define a deterministic algorithm AL
that provides objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition
in the denumerable sequence {[F (1), [F (2)], . . .}] under the interpretation.
We note that although every algorithmically computable formula with a single
variable is algorithmically verifiable, the converse is not true.
Example: Since it follows from Alan Turing’s Halting argument40 that there are algorithmically
uncomputable real numbers:
• Let [R(n)] denote the nth digit in the decimal expression of an algorithmically uncomputable
real number R in binary notation.
• Then, for any given natural number n, there is a deterministic algorithm ALn that will decide
the truth/falsity of each proposition in the sequence {[R(1) = 0], [R(2) = 0], . . . , [R(n) = 0]}.
• However, there is no deterministic algorithm AL that will decide the truth/falsity of each
proposition in the denumerable sequence {[R(1) = 0], [R(2) = 0], . . .}.
• Hence the relational formula [R(x) = 0] is algorithmically verifiable but not algorithmically
computable.
We note that we can generalise Definition 12 to:
Definition 14 Algorithmic verifiability
An arithmetical relational formula [F (x1, x2, . . . , xk)] is algorithmically verifi-
able under an interpretation if, and only if, for any given sequence of numerals
[a1, a2, . . . , ak], we can define a deterministic algorithm ALa which provides ob-
jective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of the formula [F (a1, a2, . . . , ak)]
under the interpretation.
We show in Section 5 that the ‘algorithmic verifiability’ of the formulas of a for-
mal language which contain logical constants can be inductively defined under
an interpretation in terms of the ‘algorithmic verifiability’ of the interpreta-
tions of the atomic formulas of the language; further, that the PA-formulas
are decidable under the standard interpretation of PA if, and only if, they are
algorithmically verifiable under the interpretation (Corollary 2).
We can similarly generalise Definition 13 to:
40[Tu36], p.132, §8.
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Definition 15 Algorithmic computability
An arithmetical relational formula [F (x1, x2, . . . , xk)] is algorithmically com-
putable under an interpretation if, and only if, we can define a deterministic
algorithm AL that, for any given sequence of numerals [a1, a2, . . . , ak], provides
objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of the proposition [F (a1, a2, . . . , ak)]
under the interpretation.
We show in Section 5 that the ‘algorithmic computability’ of the formulas of a
formal language which contain logical constants can also be inductively defined
under an interpretation in terms of the ‘algorithmic computability’ of the inter-
pretations of the atomic formulas of the language; further, that the PA-formulas
are decidable under an algorithmic interpretation of PA if, and only if, they are
algorithmically computable under the interpretation .
We now show that the above concepts are well-defined under the standard in-
terpretation of PA.
5 The implicit Satisfaction condition in Tarski’s
inductive assignment of truth-values under an
interpretation
We first consider the significance of the implicit Satisfaction condition in Tarski’s
inductive assignment of truth-values under an interpretation.
We note that—essentially following standard expositions41 of Tarski’s inductive
definitions on the ‘satisfiability’ and ‘truth’ of the formulas of a formal language
under an interpretation—we can define:
Definition 16 If [A] is an atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of a formal lan-
guage S, then the denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) in the domain D of an
interpretation IS(D) of S satisfies [A] if, and only if:
(i) [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] interprets under IS(D) as a unique relation
A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) in D for any witness WD of D;
(ii) there is a Satisfaction Method, SM(IS(D)) that provides objective
evidence42 by which any witness WD of D can objectively define for
any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S, and any given denumer-
able sequence (b1, b2, . . .) of D, whether the proposition A
∗(b1, b2, . . . , bn)
holds or not in D;
(iii) A∗(a1, a2, . . . , an) holds in D for any WD.
Witness: From a finitary perspective, the existence of a ‘witness’ as in (i) above
is implicit in the usual expositions of Tarski’s definitions.
Satisfaction Method: From a finitary perspective, the existence of a Satisfac-
tion Method as in (ii) above is also implicit in the usual expositions of Tarski’s
definitions.
41cf. [Me64], p.51.
42In the sense of [Mu91].
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A finitary perspective: We highlight the word ‘define’ in (ii) above to em-
phasise the finitary perspective underlying this paper; which is that the concepts
of ‘satisfaction’ and ‘truth’ under an interpretation are to be explicitly viewed as
objective assignments by a convention that is witness-independent. A Platon-
ist perspective would substitute ‘decide’ for ‘define’, thus implicitly suggesting
that these concepts can ‘exist’, in the sense of needing to be discovered by some
witness-dependent means—eerily akin to a ‘revelation’—if the domain D is N .
Classically, we can now inductively assign truth values of ‘satisfaction’, ‘truth’,
and ‘falsity’ to the compound formulas of a first-order theory S under the in-
terpretation IS(D) in terms of only the satisfiability of the atomic formulas of S
over D as usual43:
Definition 17 A denumerable sequence s of D satisfies [¬A] under IS(D) if,
and only if, s does not satisfy [A];
Definition 18 A denumerable sequence s of D satisfies [A → B] under IS(D)
if, and only if, either it is not the case that s satisfies [A], or s satisfies [B];
Definition 19 A denumerable sequence s of D satisfies [(∀xi)A] under IS(D)
if, and only if, given any denumerable sequence t of D which differs from s in
at most the i’th component, t satisfies [A];
We note that classical theory assumes without qualification44 that, if the atomic
formulas of S are decidable, then it is always decidable whether a denumerable
sequence s of D satisfies [(∀xi)A] under IS(D).
Definition 20 A well-formed formula [A] of D is true under IS(D) if, and only
if, given any denumerable sequence t of D, t satisfies [A];
Definition 21 A well-formed formula [A] of D is false under IS(D) if, and only
if, it is not the case that [A] is true under IS(D).
It follows that45:
Theorem 1 (Satisfaction Theorem) If, for any interpretation IS(D) of a first-
order theory S, there is a Satisfaction Method SM(IS(D)) which holds for a
witness WD of D, then:
(i) The ∆0 formulas of S are decidable as either true or false over
D under IS(D);
(ii) If the ∆n formulas of S are decidable as either true or as false
over D under IS(D), then so are the ∆(n+ 1) formulas of S.
43See [Me64], p.51; [Mu91].
44The need for a belief in the soundness of the Standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of
PA as an article of faith—falsified by Theorem 7—can be traced to this lack of qualification
which, as Edward Nelson coloufully dramatises in [Ne00], “. . . is the battlefield where clash
the armies of Platonists, intuitionists, and formalists. It differs from syntactical definitions
because it invokes the notion of an infinite search. We have left the realm of the concrete for
the speculative”.
45cf. [Me64], pp.51-53.
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Proof It follows from the above definitions that:
(a) If, for any given atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S, it is decidable
by WD whether or not a given denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) of D satis-
fies [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under IS(D) then, for any given compound formula
[A1(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S containing any one of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it
is decidable by WD whether or not (a1, a2, . . .) satisfies [A
1(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D
under IS(D);
(b) If, for any given compound formula [Bn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S containing n
of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it is decidable by WD whether or not a given
denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) of D satisfies [B
n(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under
IS(D) then, for any given compound formula [B
(n+1)(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S con-
taining n+ 1 of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it is decidable by WD whether or
not (a1, a2, . . .) satisfies [B
(n+1)(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under IS(D);
We thus have that:
(c) The ∆0 formulas of S are decidable by WD as either true or false over D
under IS(D);
(d) If the ∆n formulas of S are decidable by WD as either true or as false over
D under IS(D), then so are the ∆(n+ 1) formulas of S. ✷
In other words, if the atomic formulas of of S interpret under IS(D) as decidable
with respect to the Satisfaction Method SM(IS(D)) by a witness WD over some
domain D, then the propositions of S (i.e., the Πn and Σn formulas of S) also
interpret as decidable with respect to SM(IS(D)) by the witness WD over D.
We now consider the application of Tarski’s definitions to various interpretations
of first-order Peano Arithmetic PA.
5.1 The standard interpretation of PA
The standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA is obtained if, in IS(D):
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic46;
(b) we define D as N ;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA and sequence
(a1, a2, . . . , an) of N , we take ‖SATCON(IPA(N))‖ as:
‖A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n) holds in N and, for any given sequence
(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) of N , the proposition A
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) is
decidable in N‖;
(d) we define the witness W(N, Standard) informally as the ‘math-
ematical intuition’ of a human intelligence for whom, classically,
‖SATCON(IPA(N))‖ has been implicitly accepted as objectively ‘de-
cidable’ in N ;
46Where the string [(∃ . . .)] is defined as—and is to be treated as an abbreviation for—
the string [¬(∀ . . .)¬]. We do not consider the case where the underlying logic is Hilbert’s
formalisation of Aristotle’s logic of predicates in terms of his ǫ-operator ([Hi27], pp.465-466).
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We shall show that such acceptance is justified, but needs to be made
explicit since:
Lemma 1 A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is both algorithmically verifiable and
algorithmically computable in N by W(N, Standard).
Proof (i) It follows from the argument in Theorem 2 (below) that
A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is algorithmically verifiable inN byW(N, Standard).
(ii) It follows from the argument in Theorem 3 (below) that A∗(x1, x2,
. . . , xn) is algorithmically computable in N byW(N, Standard). The
lemma follows. ✷
Now, although it is not immediately obvious from the standard in-
terpretation of PA which of (i) or (ii) may be taken for explicitly
deciding ‖SATCON(IPA(N))‖ by the witness W(N, Standard), we
shall show in Section 5.3 that (i) is consistent with (e) below; and
in Section 5.5 that (ii) is inconsistent with (e). Thus the standard
interpretation of PA implicitly presumes (i).
(e) we postulate that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N47.
Clearly, (e) does not form any part of Tarski’s inductive definitions of the satis-
faction, and truth, of the formulas of PA under the above interpretation. More-
over, its inclusion makes IPA(N, Standard) extraneously non-finitary
48.
The question arises: Can we formulate the ‘standard’ interpretation of PA with-
out assuming (e) extraneously?
We answer this question affirmatively in Section 5.3 where:
(1) We replace the ‘mathematical intuition’ of a human intelligence by defining
an ‘objective’ witness W(N, Instantiational) as the meta-theory MPA of PA;
(2) We show that W(N, Instantiational) can decide whether c
∗ = d∗ is true or
false by instantiationally computing the Boolean function A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for
any given sequence of natural numbers (b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n);
(3) We show that this yields an instantiational interpretation of PA over the
structure [N] of the PA numerals that is sound if, and only if, (e) holds.
(4) W(N, Instantiational) is thus an instantiational formulation of the standard
interpretation of PA over N (which is presumed to be sound).
We note further that if PA is ω-inconsistent, then Aristotle’s particularisation
does not hold over N , and the interpretation IPA(N, Standard) is not sound.
5.2 Go¨del’s non-standard interpretation of PA
A non-standard (Go¨delian) interpretation IPA(Nω, Non−standard) of a putative
ω-consistent PA is obtained if, in IS(D):
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as an undefined extension Nω of N ;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA and sequence
(a1, a2, . . . , an) of Nω, we take ‖SATCON(IPA(Nω))‖ as:
47Hence a PA formula such as [(∃x)F (x)] interprets under IPA(N, Standard) as ‘There is
some natural number n such that F (n) holds in N .
48[Br08].
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‖A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n) holds in Nω and, for any given se-
quence (b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) ofNω, the propositionA
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n)
is decidable as either holding or not holding in Nω‖;
(d) we postulate that ‖SATCON(IPA(Nω))‖ is always decidable by a
putative witness WNω , and that WNω can, further, determine some
numbers in Nω which are not natural numbers;
(e) we assume that PA is ω-consistent.
Clearly, the interpretation IPA(Nω, Non−standard) of a putative ω-consistent PA
cannot claim to be finitary. Moreover, if PA is ω-inconsistent, then the Go¨delian
non-standard interpretation IPA(Nω, Non−standard) of PA is also not sound
49.
5.3 An instantiational interpretation of PA in PA
We next consider the instantiational interpretation50 IPA(N, Instantiational) of
PA where:
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as the set N of PA numerals;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA and any se-
quence [(a1, a2, . . . , an)] of PA numerals, we take ‖SATCON(IPA(PA))‖
as:
‖[A(a1, a2, . . . , an)] is provable in PA and, for any given
sequence of numerals [(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] of PA, the formula
[A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is decidable as either provable or not
provable in PA‖;
(d) we define the witness W(N, Instantiational) as the meta-theory
MPA of PA.
Lemma 2 [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is always algorithmically verifiable in
PA by W(N, Instantiational).
Proof It follows from Go¨del’s definition of the primitive recursive
relation xBy51—where x is the Go¨del number of a proof sequence
in PA whose last term is the PA formula with Go¨del-number y—
that, if [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA, then MPA
can algorithmically verify for any given sequence [(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] of
PA numerals which one of the PA formulas [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] and
[¬A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is necessarily PA-provable. ✷
Now, if PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then there is a Go¨delian formula
[R(x)] such that (see Section 8):
(i) [(∀x)R(x)] is not PA-provable;
(ii) [¬(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable;
(iii) for any given numeral [n], [R(n)] is PA-provable.
49In which case we cannot validly conclude from Go¨del’s formal reasoning in ([Go31]) that
PA must have a non-standard model.
50The raison d’eˆtre, and significance, of such interpretation is outlined in this short note.
51[Go31], p. 22(45).
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However, if IPA(N, Instantiational) is sound, then (ii) implies contradictorily that
it is not the case that, for any given numeral [n], [R(n)] is PA-provable.
It follows that if IPA(N, Instantiational) is sound then PA is ω-consistent and,
ipso facto, Aristotle’s particularisation must hold over N.
Moreover, if PA is consistent, then every PA-provable formula interprets as
true under some sound interpretation of PA. HenceMPA can effectively decide
whether, for any given sequence of natural numbers (b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) in N, the
proposition A∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) holds or not in N.
It follows that IPA(N, Instantiational) is an instantiational formulation of the
‘standard’ interpretation of PA in which we do not need to extraneously assume
that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N.
The interpretation IPA(N, Instantiational) is of interest because, if it were a sound
interpretation of PA, then PA would meta-mathematically establish its own
consistency52!
5.4 A set-theoretic interpretation of PA
We consider next a set-theoretic interpretation IPA(ZF , Cantor) of PA over the
domain of ZF sets, which is obtained if, in IS(D):
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as ZF;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] and sequence [(a1, a2, . . . , an)]
of PA, we take ‖SATCON(IS(ZF))‖ as:
‖[A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n)] is provable in ZF and, for any given
sequence [(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n)] of ZF, the formula [A
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n)]
is decidable as either provable or not provable in ZF‖;
(d) we define the witnessWZF as the meta-theoryMZF of ZF which
can always decide effectively whether or not ‖SATCON(IS(ZF))‖
holds in ZF.
Now, if the set-theoretic interpretation IPA(ZF , Cantor) of PA is sound, then
every sound interpretation of ZF would, ipso facto, be a sound interpretation of
PA. In Appendix E, Section 13.2 I show, however, that this is not the case, and
so the set-theoretic interpretation IPA(ZF, Cantor) of PA is not sound.
5.5 A purely algorithmic interpretation of PA
We finally consider the purely algorithmic interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) of
PA where:
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
52This is not possible mathematically by Go¨del’s Theorem XI in [Go31], p.36, if PA is
ω-consistent.
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(b) we define D as N ;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] and sequence (a1, a2, . . . , an)
of natural numbers in N , we take ‖SATCON(IPA(N))‖ as:
‖A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n) holds in N and, for any given sequence
(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) of N , the proposition A
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) is
decidable as either holding or not holding in N‖;
(d) we define the witness W(N, Algorithmic) as any simple functional
language that computes [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] and gives evidence that
‖SATCON(IPA(N))‖ is always effectively decidable in N :
Lemma 3 A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is always algorithmically computable
in N by W(N, Algorithmic).
Proof If [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA then, for any
given sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . . , bn], the PA formula [A(b1, b2,
. . . , bn)] is an atomic formula of the form [c = d], where [c] and [d]
are atomic PA formulas that denote PA numerals. Since [c] and [d]
are recursively defined formulas in the language of PA, it follows
from a standard result53 that, if PA is consistent, then [c = d] is
algorithmically computable as either true or false in N . In other
words, if PA is consistent, then [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is algorithmi-
cally computable (since there is a deterministic algorithm that, for
any given sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . . , bn], will give evidence
whether [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] interprets as true or false in N . The
lemma follows. ✷
It follows that IPA(N, Algorithmic) is an algorithmic formulation of the ‘standard’
interpretation of PA in which we do not extraneously assume that Aristotle’s
particularisation holds over N .
We shall show that if IPA(N, Algorithmic) is sound, then PA is not ω-consistent.
Hence Aristotle’s particularisation does not hold over N , and the interpretation
is finitary and intuitionistically unobjectionable. Moreover—since the Law of
the Excluded Middle is provable in an ω-inconsistent PA (and therefore holds in
N)—it achieves this without the discomforting, stringent, Intuitionistic require-
ment that we reject the underlying logic of PA!
6 Formally defining the standard interpretation
of PA finitarily
It follows from the analysis of the classical applicability of Tarski’s induc-
tive definitions of ‘satisfiability’ and ‘truth’ in Section 5 that we can formally
define—as detailed in Section 10, Appendix B—the standard interpretation
IPA(N, Standard) of PA where:
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as N ;
(c) we take SM(IPA(N, Standard)) as any simple functional language.
53For any natural numbers m, n, if m 6= n, then PA proves [¬(m = n)] ([Me64], p.110,
Proposition 3.6). The converse is obviously true.
18
We note that:
Theorem 2 The atomic formulas of PA are algorithmically verifiable under the
standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard).
Proof If [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA then, for any given
denumerable sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . .], the PA formula [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)]
is an atomic formula of the form [c = d], where [c] and [d] are atomic PA formulas
that denote PA numerals. Since [c] and [d] are recursively defined formulas in
the language of PA, it follows from a standard result that, if PA is consistent,
then [c = d] interprets as the proposition c = d which either holds or not for a
witness WN in N .
Hence, if PA is consistent, then [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is algorithmically verifi-
able since, for any given denumerable sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . .], we can
define a deterministic algorithm that provides evidence that the PA formula
[A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is decidable under the interpretation.
The theorem follows. ✷
It immediately follows that:
Corollary 1 The ‘satisfaction’ and ‘truth’ of PA formulas containing logical
constants can be defined under the standard interpretation of PA in terms of the
evidence provided by the computations of a simple functional language.
Corollary 2 The PA-formulas are decidable under the standard interpretation
of PA if, and only if, they are algorithmically verifiable under the interpretation.
6.1 Defining ‘algorithmic truth’ under the standard inter-
pretation of PA
Now we note that, in addition to Theorem 2:
Theorem 3 The atomic formulas of PA are algorithmically computable under
the standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard).
Proof If [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA then we can define a
deterministic algorithm that, for any given denumerable sequence of numerals
[b1, b2, . . .], provides evidence whether the PA formula [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is true
or false under the interpretation.
The theorem follows. ✷
This suggests the following definitions:
Definition 22 A well-formed formula [A] of PA is algorithmically true under
IPA(N, Standard) if, and only if, there is a deterministic algorithm which provides
evidence that, given any denumerable sequence t of N , t satisfies [A];
Definition 23 A well-formed formula [A] of PA is algorithmically false under
IPA(N, Standard) if, and only if, it is not algorithmically true under IPA(N).
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6.1.1 An algorithmic interpretation of the PA axioms
The significance of defining ‘algorithmic truth’ under IPA(N, Standard) as above
is that:
Lemma 4 The PA axioms PA1 to PA8 are algorithmically computable as algo-
rithmically true over N under the interpretation IPA(N, Standard).
Proof Since [x + y], [x ⋆ y], [x = y], [x′] are defined recursively54, the PA
axioms PA1 to PA8 interpret as recursive relations that do not involve any
quantification. The lemma follows straightforwardly from Definitions 16 to 21
in Section 5 and Theorem 2. ✷
Lemma 5 For any given PA formula [F (x)], the Induction axiom schema [F (0)
→ (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′)))→ (∀x)F (x))] interprets as algorithmically true under
IPA(N, Standard).
Proof By Definitions 16 to 23:
(a) If [F (0)] interprets as algorithmically false under IPA(N, Standard)
the lemma is proved.
Since [F (0) → (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))) → (∀x)F (x))] interprets as
algorithmically true if, and only if, either [F (0)] interprets as algo-
rithmically false or [((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))) → (∀x)F (x)] interprets
as algorithmically true.
(b) If [F (0)] interprets as algorithmically true and [(∀x)(F (x) →
F (x′))] interprets as algorithmically false under IPA(N, Standard),
the lemma is proved.
(c) If [F (0)] and [(∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))] both interpret as algorithmi-
cally true under IPA(N, Standard), then by Definition 22 there is a
deterministic Turing machine that computes [F (x)] and, for any nat-
ural number n, will give evidence that the formula [F (n) → F (n′)]
is true under IPA(N, Standard).
Since [F (0)] interprets as algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard),
it follows that there is a deterministic Turing machine that computes
[F (x)] and, for any natural number n, will give evidence that the
formula [F (n)] is true under the interpretation.
Hence [(∀x)F (x)] is algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard).
Since the above cases are exhaustive, the lemma follows. ✷
The Poincare´-Hilbert debate: We note that Lemma 5 appears to settle
the Poincare´-Hilbert debate55 in the latter’s favour. Poincare´ believed that the
Induction Axiom could not be justified finitarily, as any such argument would
necessarily need to appeal to infinite induction. Hilbert believed that a finitary
proof of the consistency of PA was possible.
54cf. [Go31], p.17.
55See [Hi27], p.472; also [Br13], p.59; [We27], p.482; [Pa71], p.502-503.
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Lemma 6 Generalisation preserves algorithmic truth under IPA(N, Standard).
Proof The two meta-assertions:
‘[F (x)] interprets as algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard)
56’
and
‘[(∀x)F (x)] interprets as algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard)’
both mean:
[F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true under IPA(N),
Standard). ✷
It is also straightforward to see that:
Lemma 7 Modus Ponens preserves algorithmic truth under IPA(N, Standard).
✷
We thus have that:
Theorem 4 The axioms of PA are always algorithmically true under the inter-
pretation IPA(N, Standard), and the rules of inference of PA preserve the prop-
erties of algorithmic satisfaction/truth under IPA(N, Standard)
57. ✷
6.1.2 The algorithmic interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) of PA over N
is sound
We conclude that there is a deterministic algorithmic interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic)
of PA over N—formally defined in Section 11, Appendix C—such that:
Theorem 5 The interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) of PA is sound
58.
Proof It follows immediately from Theorem 4 and Section 11, Appendix C, that
the axioms of PA are always true under the interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic),
and the rules of inference of PA preserve the properties of satisfaction/truth
under IPA(N, Algorithmic). ✷
We thus have a finitary proof that:
Theorem 6 PA is consistent. ✷
Hilbert’s Second Problem: We note—but do not consider further as it is
not germane to the intent of this investigation—that Lemma 6 offers a partial
resolution to Hilbert’s Second Problem, which asks for a finitary proof that the
second order Arithmetical axioms are consistent59.
56See Definition 20
57Without appeal, moreover, to Aristotle’s particularisation.
58In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
59“When we are engaged in investigating the foundations of a science, we must set up a
system of axioms which contains an exact and complete description of the relations subsisting
between the elementary ideas of that science. . . . But above all I wish to designate the following
as the most important among the numerous questions which can be asked with regard to the
axioms: To prove that they are not contradictory, that is, that a definite number of logical
steps based upon them can never lead to contradictory results. In geometry, the proof of
the compatibility of the axioms can be effected by constructing a suitable field of numbers,
such that analogous relations between the numbers of this field correspond to the geometrical
axioms. . . . On the other hand a direct method is needed for the proof of the compatibility of
the arithmetical axioms.” . . . [Nw02].
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7 A Provability Theorem for PA
We now show that PA can have no non-standard model60, since it is ‘algorith-
mically’ complete in the sense that:
Theorem 7 (Provability Theorem for PA) A PA formula [F (x)] is PA-provable
if, and only if, [F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true in N .
Proof We have by definition that [(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under the inter-
pretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) if, and only if, [F (x)] is algorithmically computable
as always true in N .
Since IPA(N, Algorithmic) is sound, it defines a finitary model of PA over N—say
MPA(β)—such that:
• If [(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable, then [F (x)] is algorithmically computable as
always true in N ;
• If [¬(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable, then it is not the case that [F (x)] is algo-
rithmically computable as always true in N .
Now, we cannot have that both [(∀x)F (x)] and [¬(∀x)F (x)] are PA-unprovable
for some PA formula [F (x)], as this would yield the contradiction:
• There is a finitary model—say M1β—of PA+[(∀x)F (x)] in which [F (x)]
is algorithmically computable as always true in N ; and
• There is a finitary model—say M2β—of PA+[¬(∀x)F (x)] in which it is
not the case that [F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true in
N .
Further, we cannot have that:
• [F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true in N , and [¬(∀x)F (x)]
is PA-provable;
nor that:
• It is not the case that [F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true
in N , and [(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable.
The lemma follows. ✷
We conclude that:
Corollary 3 The provable formulas of PA are precisely those that are algorith-
mically computable as always true under a sound interpretation of PA.
We further conclude that61:
Corollary 4 PA is categorical.
60We consider the usual arguments for the existence of non-standard models of PA in Section
14, Appendix F.
61cf. Hilbert’s remarks at the International Congress of Mathematicians at Paris in 1900:
“The axioms of arithmetic are essentially nothing else than the known rules of calculation, with
the addition of the axiom of continuity. I recently collected them and in so doing replaced the
axiom of continuity by two simpler axioms, namely, the well-known axiom of Archimedes, and
a new axiom essentially as follows: that numbers form a system of things which is capable of
no further extension, as long as all the other axioms hold (axiom of completeness).” . . . [Nw02].
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8 PA is not ω-consistent
In his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions62,
Go¨del showed that63:
Lemma 8 If a Peano Arithmetic such as PA is ω-consistent, then there is a
constructively definable PA-formula [R(x)]64 such that neither [(∀x)R(x)) nor
[¬(∀x)R(x)] are PA-provable65.✷
Go¨del concluded that:
Lemma 9 Any ω-consistent Peano Arithmetic such as PA has a consistent, but
ω-inconsistent, extension PA′, obtained by adding the formula [¬(∀x)R(x)] as
an axiom to PA66.✷
Specifically, Go¨del’s reasoning shows that:
Lemma 10 If PA is consistent and [(∀x)R(x)] is assumed PA-provable, then
[¬(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable67.✷
Lemma 11 If PA is ω-consistent and [¬(∀x)R(x)] is assumed PA-provable,
then [(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable68.✷
However, by the argument in Theorem 7 it now follows that:
Corollary 5 The PA formula [¬(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable. ✷
Of course [¬(∀x)R(x)] interprets under IPA(N, Algorithmic) as the assertion:
There is no deterministic algorithm that will compute [R(x)] and,
for any given natural number n, provide evidence that R∗(n) is a
true arithmetical proposition in N .
However, since Go¨del has shown that the PA-formula [R(n)] is PA-provable for
any given PA-numeral [n], it follows that:
For any given natural number n, there is always some deterministic
algorithm that will compute [R(n)] and provide evidence that R∗(n)
is a true arithmetical proposition in N .
Thus the PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)] is algorithmically verifiable as true over N ,
but not algorithmically computable as true over N . The arithmetical relation
R∗(x) is thus a Halting-type of relation, such that although R∗(x) is a tautology
over N , there is no deterministic algorithm that will compute [R(x)] and, for
any given natural number n, give evidence that R∗(n) is a true arithmetical
proposition in N .
We conclude that:
62[Go31].
63[Go31], Theorem VI, p.24.
64In his argument, Go¨del refers to this formula only by its ‘Go¨del’ number ‘r’; [Go31], p.25,
Eqn.(12).
65[Go31], p.25(1) & p.26(2).
66[Go31], p.27.
67This follows from Go¨del’s argument in [Go31], p.26(1).
68This follows from Go¨del’s argument in [Go31], p.26(2).
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Corollary 6 PA is not ω-consistent.69
Proof Go¨del has shown that if PA is consistent, then [R(n)] is PA-provable for
any given PA numeral [n]70. By Corollary 5 and the definition of ω-consistency,
if PA is consistent then it is not ω-consistent. ✷
Corollary 7 The standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA is not sound
71,
and does not yield a model of PA72.
Proof By Corollary 9 if PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then Aristotle’s
particularisation does not hold over N . Since the ‘standard’, interpretation of
PA appeals to Aristotle’s particularisation, the lemma follows. ✷
9 Appendix A: The significance of ω-consistency
and Hilbert’s program
In order to avoid intuitionistic objections to his reasoning in his seminal 1931
paper on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions73, Kurt Go¨del did not
assume that the standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA is sound
74. In-
stead, Go¨del introduced the syntactic property of ω-consistency75 as an explicit
assumption in his formal reasoning76. Go¨del explained at some length77 that his
reasons for introducing ω-consistency as an explicit assumption in his formal rea-
soning was to avoid appealing to the semantic concept of classical arithmetical
truth—a concept which is implicitly based on an intuitionistically objectionable
logic that assumes Aristotle’s particularisation78 is valid over N .
However, we now show that if we assume the standard interpretation of PA is
sound79, then PA is consistent if, and only if, it is ω-consistent.
9.0.3 Hilbert’s ω-Rule
To place the issue in the perspective of this paper, we consider the question:
Assuming that PA has a sound80 interpretation over N , is it true
that:
69This conclusion is contrary to accepted dogma. See, for instance, Davis’ remarks in
[Da82], p.129(iii) that “. . . there is no equivocation. Either an adequate arithmetical logic
is ω-inconsistent (in which case it is possible to prove false statements within it) or it has
an unsolvable decision problem and is subject to the limitations of Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem”.
70[Go31], p.26(2).
71In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
72We note that finitists of all hues—ranging from Brouwer [Br08] to Alexander Yessenin-
Volpin [He04]—have persistently questioned the soundness of the ‘standard’ interpretation
IPA(N, Standard).
73[Go31].
74In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
75Definition 8.
76[Go31], p.23 and p.28.
77In his introduction on p.9 of [Go31].
78Definition 1.
79In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
80In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
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Algorithmic ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)]
interprets as an arithmetical relation F ∗(x) that is algorithmically
computable as true for any given natural number n, then the PA
formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in
PA?
The significance of this query is that, as part of his program for giving math-
ematical reasoning a finitary foundation, Hilbert81 proposed an ω-Rule as a
finitary means of extending a Peano Arithmetic to a possible completion (i.e.
to logically showing that, given any arithmetical proposition, either the proposi-
tion, or its negation, is formally provable from the axioms and rules of inference
of the extended Arithmetic).
Hilbert’s ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)] in-
terprets as an arithmetical relation F ∗(x) that is true for any given
natural number n, then the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted
as an initial formula (axiom) in PA.
Now, in his 1931 paper—which can, not unreasonably, be seen as the outcome of
a presumed attempt to validate Hilbert’s ω-rule—Go¨del introduced the concept
of ω-consistency82, from which it follows that:
Lemma 12 If we meta-assume Hilbert’s ω-rule for PA, then a consistent PA
is necessarily ω-consistent83. ✷
Proof If the PA formula [F (x)] interprets as an arithmetical relation F ∗(x)
that is true for any given natural number n, and the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)]
can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in PA, ¬[(∀x)F (x)] cannot be
PA-provable if PA is consistent. The lemma follows. ✷
Moreover, it follows from Go¨del’s 1931 paper that one consequence of assuming
Hilbert’s ω-Rule is that there must, then, be an undecidable arithmetical propo-
sition84; a further consequence of which is that PA is essentially incomplete.
However, since Go¨del’s argument in this paper—from which he concludes the
existence of an undecidable arithmetical proposition—is based on the weaker
(i.e., weaker than assuming Hilbert’s ω-rule) premise that a consistent PA can
be ω-consistent, the question arises whether an even weaker Algorithmic ω-
Rule (which, prima facie, does not imply that a consistent PA is necessarily
ω-consistent) can yield a finitary completion for PA as sought by Hilbert, albeit
for an ω-inconsistent PA.
9.0.4 Aristotle’s particularisation and ω-consistency
We shall now argue that these issues are related, and that placing them in an
appropriate perspective requires questioning not only the persisting belief that
81cf. [Hi30], pp.485-494.
82[Go31], p.23.
83However, we cannot similarly conclude from the the Algorithmic ω-Rule that a consistent
PA is necessarily ω-consistent.
84Go¨del constructed an arithmetical proposition [R(x)] and showed that, if a Peano Arith-
metic is ω-consistent, then both [(∀x)R(x)] and [¬(∀x)R(x)] are unprovable in the Arithmetic
([Go31], p.25(1), p.26(2)).
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Aristotle’s 2000-year old logic of predicates—a critical component of which is
Aristotle’s particularisation—remains valid even when applied over an infinite
domain such as N , but also the basis of Brouwer’s denial of the Law of the
Excluded Middle following his challenge of the belief in 190885.
Now, we have that:
Lemma 13 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then there is some PA for-
mula [F (x)] such that, under any sound86 interpretation—say IPA(N, Sound)—of
PA over N :
(i) for any given numeral [n], the PA formula [F (n)] interprets as
true under IPA(N, Sound);
(ii) the PA formula [¬(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N, Sound).
Proof The lemma follows from the definition of ω-consistency and from Tarski’s
standard definitions87 of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal
system such as PA under an interpretation as detailed in Section 5. ✷
Further:
Lemma 14 If the interpretation IPA(N) admits Aristotle’s particularisation
over N88, and the PA formula [¬(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N),
then there is some unspecified PA numeral [m] such that the PA formula [F (m)]
interprets as false under IPA(N).
Proof The lemma follows from Aristotle’s particularisation and Tarski’s stan-
dard definitions of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal system
such as PA under an interpretation. ✷
Hence:
Lemma 15 If PA is consistent and Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N ,
there can be no PA formula [F (x)] such that, under any sound89 interpretation
IPA(N, Sound) of PA over N :
(i) for any given numeral [n], the PA formula [F (n)] interprets as
true under IPA(N, Sound);
(ii) the PA formula [¬(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N, Sound).
Proof The lemma follows from the previous two lemma. ✷
In other words90:
85[Br08].
86In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
87[Ta33]; see also [Ho01] for an explanatory exposition. However, for standardisation and
convenience of expression, We follow the formal exposition of Tarski’s definitions given in
[Me64], p.50.
88As, for instance, in [Me64], pp.51-52 V(ii).
89In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
90The above argument is made explicit in view of Martin Davis’ remark in [Da82], p.129,
that such a proof of ω-consistency may be “. . . open to the objection of circularity”.
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Corollary 8 If PA is consistent and Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N ,
then PA is ω-consistent. ✷
It follows that:
Lemma 16 If Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N , then PA is consistent
if, and only if, it is ω-consistent.
Proof If PA is ω-consistent then, since [n = n] is PA-provable for any given PA
numeral [n], we cannot have that [¬(∀x)(x = x)] is PA-provable. Since an in-
consistent PA proves [¬(∀x)(x = x)], an ω-consistent PA cannot be inconsistent.
✷
The arguments of this section thus suggest that J. Barkley Rosser’s ‘extension’ of
Go¨del’s argument91 succeeds in avoiding an explicit assumption of ω-consistency
only by implicitly appealing to Aristotle’s particularisation.
It further follows that:
Corollary 9 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then Aristotle’s particu-
larisation does not hold over N . ✷
As the classical, ‘standard’, interpretation of PA—say IPA(N, Standard)—appeals
to Aristotle’s particularisation92, it follows that:
Corollary 10 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then the standard in-
terpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA is not sound
93, and does not yield a model
of PA. ✷
10 Appendix B: The standard interpretation
IPA(N, Standard) of PA over N
We define the ‘satisfiability’ and ‘truth’ of the formulas of PA under the standard
interpretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA over N formally as follows:
Definition 24 If [A] is an atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA, then the
denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) in the domain N of the interpretation IPA(N,
Standard) of PA satisfies [A] if, and only if:
(i) [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] interprets under IPA(N, Standard) as a unique
relation A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) in N for any witness WN of N ;
(ii) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA, and any given
denumerable sequence (b1, b2, . . .) of N , there is a deterministic al-
gorithm that computes A∗(b1, b2, . . . , bn) and provides objective evi-
dence by which any witness WN of N can define whether the propo-
sition A∗(b1, b2, . . . , bn) holds or not in N ;
(iii) A∗(a1, a2, . . . , an) holds in N for any WN .
91[Ro36].
92See, for instance, [Me64], p.107 and p.52(V)(ii).
93In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10.
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We inductively assign truth values of ‘satisfaction’, ‘truth’, and ‘falsity’ to the
compound formulas of PA under the interpretation IPA(N, Standard) in terms of
only the satisfiability of the atomic formulas of PA over N as follows94:
Definition 25 A denumerable sequence s of N satisfies [¬A] under IPA(N, Stan−
dard) if, and only if, s does not satisfy [A];
Definition 26 A denumerable sequence s of N satisfies [A→ B] under IPA(N,
Standard) if, and only if, either it is not the case that s satisfies [A], or s satisfies
[B];
Definition 27 A denumerable sequence s of N satisfies [(∀xi)A] under IPA(N,
Standard) if, and only if, given any denumerable sequence t of N which differs
from s in at most the i’th component, t satisfies [A];
Definition 28 A well-formed formula [A] of N is true95 under IPA(N, Standard)
if, and only if, given any denumerable sequence t of N , t satisfies [A];
Definition 29 A well-formed formula [A] of N is false under IPA(N, Standard)
if, and only if, it is not the case that [A] is true under IPA(N, Standard).
11 Appendix C: The algorithmic interpretation
IPA(N, Algorithmic) of PA over N
We define the ‘satisfiability’ and ‘truth’ of the formulas of PA under the algo-
rithmic interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) of PA over N formally as follows:
Definition 30 If [A] is an atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA, then the
denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) in the domain N of the interpretation IPA(N,
Algorithmic) of PA satisfies [A] if, and only if:
(i) [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] interprets under IPA(N, Algorithmic) as a unique
relation A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) in N for any witness WN of N ;
(ii) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA, there is a de-
terministic algorithm that computes [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] and for any
given denumerable sequence (b1, b2, . . .) of N , provides objective evi-
dence by which any witness WN of N can define whether the propo-
sition A∗(b1, b2, . . . , bn) holds or not in N ;
(iii) A∗(a1, a2, . . . , an) holds in N for any WN .
We inductively assign truth values of ‘satisfaction’, ‘truth’, and ‘falsity’ to the
compound formulas of PA under the interpretation IPA(N, Algorithmic) in terms
of only the satisfiability of the atomic formulas of PA over N as follows96:
94Compare [Me64], p.51; [Mu91].
95Note that this definition of ‘truth’ is best described as ‘instantiational’ when compared
to the corresponding ‘algorithmic’ definition of ‘truth’ (Definition 34) in Section 11. The sig-
nificance of the distinction between ‘instantiational’ and ‘algorithmic’ methods is highlighted
in Section 12, Appendix D.
96Compare [Me64], p.51; [Mu91].
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Definition 31 A denumerable sequence s of N satisfies [¬A] under IPA(N, Algo−
rithmic) if, and only if, s does not satisfy [A];
Definition 32 A denumerable sequence s of N satisfies [A→ B] under IPA(N,
Algorithmic) if, and only if, either it is not the case that s satisfies [A], or s
satisfies [B];
Definition 33 A denumerable sequence s of N satisfies [(∀xi)A] under IPA(N,
Algorithmic) if, and only if, given any denumerable sequence t of N which differs
from s in at most the i’th component, t satisfies [A].
Definition 34 A well-formed formula [A] of N is true97 under IPA(N, Algorithmic)
if, and only if, given any denumerable sequence t of N , t satisfies [A];
Definition 35 A well-formed formula [A] of N is false under IPA(N, Algorithmic)
if, and only if, it is not the case that [A] is true under IPA(N, Algorithmic).
12 Appendix D: The need for explicitly distin-
guishing between ‘instantiational’ and ‘uni-
form’ methods
It is significant that both Kurt Go¨del (initially) and Alonzo Church (subseque-
ntly—possibly under the influence of Go¨del’s disquietitude) enunciated Church’s
formulation of ‘effective computability’ as a Thesis because Go¨del was instinc-
tively uncomfortable with accepting it as a definition that minimally captures
the essence of ‘intuitive effective computability’98.
Go¨del’s reservations seem vindicated if we accept that a number-theoretic func-
tion can be effectively computable instantiationally (in the sense of being algo-
rithmically verifiable as envisaged in Definition 12 above), but not by a uniform
method (in the sense of being algorithmically computable as envisaged in Defi-
nition 13).
The significance of the fact (considered above in Section 5) that ‘truth’ too can
be effectively decidable both instantiationally and by a uniform (algorithmic)
method under the standard interpretation of PA is reflected in Go¨del’s famous
1951 Gibbs lecture99, where he remarks:
“I wish to point out that one may conjecture the truth of a univer-
sal proposition (for example, that I shall be able to verify a certain
property for any integer given to me) and at the same time conjec-
ture that no general proof for this fact exists. It is easy to imag-
ine situations in which both these conjectures would be very well
founded. For the first half of it, this would, for example, be the case
if the proposition in question were some equation F (n) = G(n) of
two number-theoretical functions which could be verified up to very
great numbers n.”100
97Algorithmically. The significance of the distinction between ‘instantiaional’ and ‘algorith-
mic’ methods is highlighted in Section 12, Appendix D.
98See [Si97].
99[Go51].
100Parikh’s paper [Pa71] can also be viewed as an attempt to investigate the consequences
of expressing the essence of Go¨del’s remarks formally.
29
Such a possibility is also implicit in Turing’s remarks101:
“The computable numbers do not include all (in the ordinary sense)
definable numbers. Let P be a sequence whose n-th figure is 1 or
0 according as n is or is not satisfactory. It is an immediate conse-
quence of the theorem of §8 that P is not computable. It is (so far as
we know at present) possible that any assigned number of figures of
P can be calculated, but not by a uniform process. When sufficiently
many figures of P have been calculated, an essentially new method
is necessary in order to obtain more figures.”
The need for placing such a distinction on a formal basis has also been expressed
explicitly on occasion102. Thus, Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey103 define a diagonal
function, d, any value of which can be decided effectively, although there is no
deterministic algorithm that can effectively compute d.
Now, the straightforward way of expressing this phenomenon should be to say
that there are well-defined number-theoretic functions that are effectively com-
putable instantiationally but not algorithmically. Yet, following Church and
Turing, such functions are labeled as uncomputable104!
“According to Turing’s Thesis, since d is not Turing-computable, d
cannot be effectively computable. Why not? After all, although no
Turing machine computes the function d, we were able to compute at
least its first few values, For since, as we have noted, f1 = f1 = f1 =
the empty function we have d(1) = d(2) = d(3) = 1. And it may
seem that we can actually compute d(n) for any positive integer
n—if we don’t run out of time.”105
The reluctance to treat a function such as d(n)—or the function Ω(n) that
computes the nth digit in the decimal expression of a Chaitin constant Ω106—as
computable, on the grounds that the ‘time’ needed to compute it increases mono-
tonically with n, is curious107; the same applies to any total Turing-computable
function f(n)108!
101[Tu36], §9(II), p.139.
102Parikh’s distinction between ‘decidability’ and ‘feasibility’ in [Pa71] also appears to echo
the need for such a distinction.
103[BBJ03], p. 37.
104The issue here seems to be that, when using language to express the abstract objects of
our individual, and common, mental ‘concept spaces’, we use the word ‘exists’ loosely in three
senses, without making explicit distinctions between them (see [?]).
105[BBJ03], p.37.
106Chaitin’s Halting Probability is given by 0 < Ω =
∑
2−|p| < 1, where the summation is
over all self-delimiting programs p that halt, and |p| is the size in bits of the halting program
p; see [Ct75].
107The incongruity of this is addressed by Parikh in [Pa71].
108The only difference being that, in the latter case, we know there is a common ‘program’
of constant length that will compute f(n) for any given natural number n; in the former, we
know we may need distinctly different programs for computing f(n) for different values of n,
where the length of the program will, sometime, reference n.
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13 Appendix E: No model of PA can admit a
transfinite ordinal
Let [G(x)] denote the PA-formula:
[x = 0 ∨ ¬(∀y)¬(x = y′)]
Under the standard interpretation of FOL this translates, under every unrela-
tivised interpretation of PA, as:
If x denotes an element in the domain of an unrelativised interpre-
tation of PA, either x is 0, or x is a ‘successor’.
Further, in every such interpretation of PA, if G(x) denotes the interpretation
of [G(x)]:
(a) G(0) is true;
(b) If G(x) is true, then G(x′) is true.
Hence, by Go¨del’s completeness theorem:
(c) PA proves [G(0)];
(d) PA proves [G(x)→ G(x′)].
Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem: In any first-order predicate calcu-
lus, the theorems are precisely the logically valid well-formed formu-
las (i. e. those that are true in every model of the calculus).
Further, by Generalisation:
(e) PA proves [(∀x)(G(x) → G(x′))];
Hence, by Induction:
(f) [(∀x)G(x)] is provable in PA.
In other words, except 0, every element in the domain of any unrelativised
interpretation of PA is a ‘successor’. Further, x can only be a ‘successor’ of a
unique element in any such interpretation of PA.
13.1 PA and Ordinal Arithmetic have no common model
Now, since Cantor’s first limit ordinal, ω, is not the ‘successor’ of any ordinal in
the sense required by the PA axioms, and since there are no infinitely descending
sequences of ordinals109 in a model—if any—of set-theory, PA and Ordinal
Arithmetic110 cannot have a common model, and so we cannot consistently
extend PA to OA simply by the addition of more axioms.
109cf. [Me64], p261.
110cf. [Me64], p.187.
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13.2 Why PA has no set-theoretical model
We can define the usual order relation ‘<’ in PA so that every instance of the
Induction Axiom schema, such as, say:
(i) [F (0)→ ((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))→ (∀x)F (x))]
yields the PA theorem:
(ii) [F (0)→ ((∀x)((∀y)(y < x→ F (y))→ F (x))→ (∀x)F (x))]
Now, if we interpret PA without relativisation in ZF in the sense indicated by
Feferman [Fe92] — i.e., numerals as finite ordinals, [x′] as [x∪{x}], etc. — then
(ii) always translates in ZF as a theorem:
(iii) [F (0)→ ((∀x)((∀y)(y ∈ x→ F (y))→ F (x))→ (∀x)F (x))]
However, (i) does not always translate similarly as a ZF-theorem (which is why
PA and ZF can have no common model), since the following is not necessarily
provable in ZF:
(iv) [F (0)→ ((∀x)(F (x) → F (x ∪ {x}))→ (∀x)F (x))]
Example: Define [F (x)] as ‘[x ∈ ω]’.
A significant point which emerges from the above is that we cannot appeal unre-
strictedly to reasoning over transfinite ordinals when studying the foundational
framework of PA.
Reason: The language of PA has no constant that interprets in any model
of PA as the set N of all natural numbers.
Moreover, the preceding sections show that the Induction Axiom Schema of
PA does not allow us to bypass this constraint by introducing an “actual” (or
“completed”) infinity disguised as an arbitrary constant - usually denoted by c
or ∞ - into either the language, or a putative model, of PA.
14 Appendix F: Why the usual arguments for a
non-standard model of PA are unconvincing
Although we can define a model of Arithmetic with an infinite descending se-
quence of elements111, any such model is isomorphic to the “true arithmetic112”
of the integers (negative plus positive), and not to any model of PA113.
Moreover—as we show in the next section—we cannot assume that we can
consistently add a constant c to PA, along with the denumerable axioms [¬(c =
0)], [¬(c = 1)], [¬(c = 2)], . . . , since this would presume that which is sought
to be proven, viz., that PA has a non-standard model.
We cannot therefore—as suggested in standard texts114—apply the Compact-
ness Theorem and the (upward) Lo¨wen-heim-Skolem Theorem to conclude that
PA has a non-standard model.
111eg. [BBJ03], Section 25. 1, p303.
112[BBJ03]. p150. Ex. 12. 9.
113[BBJ03]. Corollary 25. 3, p306.
114eg. [BBJ03]. p306; [Me64], p112, Ex. 2.
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Compactness Theorem: If every finite subset of a set of sentences has a model,
then the whole set has a model115.
Upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem: Any set of sentences that has an infinite
model has a non-denumerable model116.
14.1 A formal argument for a non-standard model of PA
The following argument117 attempts to validate the above line of reasoning
suggested by standard texts for the existence of non-standard models of PA:
1. Let <N (the set of natural numbers); = (equality); ′ (the successor fun-
ction); + (the addition function); ∗ (the product function); 0 (the null
element)> be the structure that serves to define a sound interpretat-
ion of PA, say [N ].
2. Let T[N ] be the set of PA-formulas that are satisfied or true in [N ].
3. The PA-provable formulas form a subset of T[N ].
4. Let Γ be the countable set of all PA-formulas of the form [cn = (cn+1)
′],
where the index n is a natural number.
5. Let T be the union of Γ and T[N ].
6. T[N ] plus any finite set of members of Γ has a model, e.g., [N ] itself,
since [N ] is a model of any finite descending chain of successors.
7. Consequently, by Compactness, T has a model; call it M .
8. M has an infinite descending sequence with respect to ′ because it is a
model of Γ.
9. Since PA is a subset of T, M is a non-standard model of PA.
Now, if—as claimed above—[N ] is a model of T[N ] plus any finite set of members
of Γ, then all PA-formulas of the form [cn = (cn+1)
′] are PA-provable, Γ is a
proper sub-set of the PA-provable formulas, and T is identically T[N ].
The argument cannot be that some PA-formula of the form [cn = (cn+1)′] is true
in [N ], but not PA-provable, as this would imply that PA+[¬(cn = (cn+1)′)]
has a model other than [N ]; in other words, it would presume that PA has a
non-standard model.118
115[BBJ03]. p147.
116[BBJ03]. p163.
117[Ln08].
118The same objection applies to the usual argument found in standard texts (eg. [BBJ03].
p306; [Me64], p112, Ex. 2) which, again, is essentially that, if PA has a non-standard model at
all, then one such model is obtained by assuming we can consistently add a single non-numeral
constant c to the language of PA, and the countable axioms c 6= 0, c 6= 1, c 6= 2, . . . to PA.
However, as noted earlier, this argument too does not resolve the question of whether such
assumption validly allows us to conclude that there is a non-standard model of PA in the first
place.
To place this distinction in perspective, Legendre and Gauss independently conjectured
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Consequently, the postulated model M of T in (7), by “Compactness”, is the
model [N ] that defines T[N ]. However, [N ] has no infinite descending sequence
with respect to ′, even though it is a model of Γ. Hence the argument does not
establish the existence of a non-standard model of PA with an infinite descending
sequence with respect to the successor function ′.
14.2 The (upward) Skolem-Lo¨wenheim theorem applies
only to first-order theories that admit an axiom of
infinity
We note, moreover, that the non-existence of non-standard models of PA would
not contradict the (upward) Skolem-Lo¨wenheim theorem, since the proof of
this theorem implicitly limits its applicability amongst first-order theories to
those that are consistent with an axiom of infinity—in the sense that the proof
implicitly requires that a constant, say c, along with a denumerable set of axioms
to the effect that c 6= 0, c 6= 1, . . ., can be consistently added to the theory.
However, as seen in the previous section, this is not the case with PA.
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